

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED
, 6/26/03

FOR: JOHN MCCone

FROM: ALLEN DULLES

I have read the portions of Mr. Nixon's book with regard to the intelligence briefings which he understood Senator Kennedy had been given by me with respect to Cuba during the campaign. I have also seen the President's statement issued today on this subject.

There has been here, I believe, an honest misunderstanding. This was probably due to the nature of the message Mr. Nixon writes he received as to these briefings. The Cuban situation was, of course, dealt with in the briefings I gave to Senator Kennedy. The last briefing I gave him was over a month before the debate in which the issue arose.

My briefings were intelligence briefings on the world situation. They did not cover our own government's plans or programs for action, overt or covert.

March 20, 1962

For Mr. McCone's perusal and approval:

The President does not believe that intelligence briefings are a proper subject of public debate. But in the light of the account in Mr. Nixon's book, it ^{is} seems necessary to say that the then Senator Kennedy ^{was not told before the election of 1960} ~~knew nothing~~ of any plans for "supporting an invasion of Cuba"

~~before the election of 1960.~~ Mr. Nixon's account is apparently based on a misunderstanding of what was included in the briefings Senator Kennedy received ^{one 23rd & second in} in July and September, 1960. ^{19'}

Senator Kennedy was ^{first} informed of the operation in a briefing ^{plans for suspension an} of CIA ^{showed} by Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, given in Palm Beach on November 18, 1960. Mr. Nixon has been informed of this matter and it is our understanding that this statement ^{Pro passage understanding will be} will be corrected in subsequent editions of his book. ^{referred to}

AT

He was told
the first
66

As soon as I saw the story and read the statement I asked Fred Seaton to come to my hotel room. I knew that President Eisenhower had arranged for Kennedy to receive regular briefings by Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA (on all covert operations around the world, as well as on the latest intelligence estimates)—precisely so he would be as well aware as I of what our policies and programs were. I asked Seaton to call the White House at once on the security line and find out whether or not Dulles had briefed Kennedy on the fact that for months the CIA had not only been supporting and assisting but actually training Cuban exiles for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself.

STA

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND MR. SALINGER, 3/21/62.

1:05 p.m.

Mr. McCone: This Nixon thing looks to me like a one day wonder and my purpose in calling you is to suggest that you suggest to the President that if he gets a question this afternoon that he just say he can't add anything to what's in the paper and just let it go at that.

Mr. Salinger: We fully intend to do that.

Mr. McCone: I just had a talk with Dulles and Ike wanted him to call Nixon. I said I thought he should just wait until after the press conference and then call Ike and tell him he thought no useful purpose could be served in his calling Nixon. I think this thing is getting out of all proportions.

Mr. Salinger: I agree with you completely and agree with your suggestion.

Mr. McCone: If he plays it on a low key then it will just be forgotten.

Mr. Salinger: I agree with you.

A.P.

RICHARD M. NIXON

"SIX CRISES"

*Hold for
further
reference*

UPI-90
(NIXON)

WASHINGTON--THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY CHALLENGED A STATEMENT BY FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS INFORMED DURING THE 1960 CAMPAIGN THAT CUBAN EXILES WERE BEING TRAINED BY THIS COUNTRY FOR AN INVASION OF THEIR HOMELAND.

NIXON IN HIS NEW BOOK, "SIX CRISES," WROTE THAT HE FELT KENNEDY, THEN A PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE, ENDANGERED THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BY CALLING DURING THE CAMPAIGN FOR U.S. INTERVENTION IN CUBA. THE FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SAID KENNEDY HAD BEEN TOLD IN SECRET INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS OF EARLY PREPARATIONS FOR A CUBAN INVASION.

THE WHITE HOUSE SAID THIS WAS NOT TRUE AND SUGGESTED THAT NIXON'S ACCOUNT WAS "APPARENTLY BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING."

"THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS ARE A PROPER SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE," PRESS SECRETARY SALINGER SAID.

"BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACCOUNT IN MR. NIXON'S BOOK IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THE THEN-SENATOR KENNEDY WAS NOT TOLD BEFORE THE ELECTION OF 1960 OF THE TRAINING OF TROOPS OUTSIDE OF CUBA OR OF ANY PLANS FOR 'SUPPORTING AN INVASION OF CUBA.'"

3/20--JR1258PES

UPI-96

ADD 1 NIXON, WASHINGTON (UPI-90)
SALINGER SAID NIXON'S ACCOUNT "IS APPARENTLY BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING. SEN. KENNEDY RECEIVED TWO BRIEFINGS FROM MR. ALLEN DULLES OF THE CIA, THE FIRST ON JULY 23, 1960, AND THE SECOND ON SEPT. 19, 1960. THE TWO BRIEFINGS COVERED AN OVERALL REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION, DURING WHICH CUBA WAS MENTIONED."
"BUT SEN. KENNEDY WAS FIRST INFORMED OF THE OPERATION TO WHICH MR. NIXON REFERS IN A BRIEFING BY ALLEN DULLES AND RICHARD BISSELL OF THE CIA, GIVEN IN PALM BEACH, FLA., ON NOV. 18, 1960."
SALINGER'S COMMENT WAS IN THE FORM OF A WRITTEN STATEMENT PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF NEWS INQUIRIES.

UPI-97

ADD 2 NIXON, WASHINGTON
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, SALINGER SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD READ CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NIXON BOOK, BUT NOT THE ENTIRE VOLUME. SALINGER ALSO SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW NO ADVANCE COPY OF THE BOOK WAS SENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT HE, SALINGER, ACQUIRED ONE THROUGH A FRIEND.
ASKED TO DISCUSS OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BOOK, SALINGER DECLINED. HE SAID THE WHITE HOUSE WAS WILLING TO COMMENT ON ONE SPECIFIC SECTION BECAUSE IT INVOLVED NATIONAL INTEREST, BUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REACTION FROM THE WHITE HOUSE TO OTHER PORTIONS OF THE BOOK.

3/20--JR113PES

250287

UPI-101

(TEXT)

WASHINGTON--TEXT OF PRESS SECRETARY SALINGER'S STATEMENT ON FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S PUBLISHED COMMENTS ABOUT CUBA:

"THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS ARE A PROPER SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACCOUNT IN MR. NIXON'S BOOK IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THE THEN SEN. KENNEDY WAS NOT TOLD BEFORE THE ELECTION OF 1960 OF THE TRAINING OF TROOPS OUTSIDE OF CUBA OR OF ANY PLANS FOR 'SUPPORTING AN INVASION OF CUBA.'

"MR. NIXON'S ACCOUNT IS APPARENTLY BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING. SEN. KENNEDY RECEIVED TWO BRIEFINGS FROM MR. ALLEN DULLES OF THE CIA. THE FIRST ON JULY 23, 1960, AND THE SECOND ON SEPT. 19, 1960. THE TWO BRIEFINGS COVERED AN OVERALL REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION DURING WHICH CUBA WAS MENTIONED. BUT SEN. KENNEDY WAS FIRST INFORMED OF THE OPERATION TO WHICH MR. NIXON REFERS IN A BRIEFING BY ALLEN DULLES AND RICHARD BISSEL OF THE CIA GIVEN IN PALM BEACH, FLA., ON NOV. 18, 1960."

(END TEXT)

3/20--GE129P

A164'WX
BULLETIN

FIRST LEAD NIXON BOOK
WASHINGTON, MARCH 20 (AP)-THE WHITE HOUSE, ANSWERING A CHARGE BY FORMER VICE PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON, INSISTED TODAY THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS UNAWARE OF U.S. SUPPORT OF A POSSIBLE CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT UNTIL AFTER HE WON THE 1960 ELECTION.
JC1252PES

A165'WX
BULLETIN MATTER

WASHINGTON--FIRST ADD FIRST LEAD NIXON BOOK X X X 1960 ELECTION. PRESS SECRETARY PIERRE SALINGER SAID KENNEDY HAD RECEIVED TWO BRIEFINGS FROM ALLEN DULLES, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DURING THE 1960 CAMPAIGN, BUT THESE CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF A BROAD REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION. NIXON ALLEGES IN HIS BOOK, "SIX CRISES," THAT KENNEDY "WAS ENDANGERING THE SECURITY" OF THE CUBAN OPERATION BY CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS.

NIXON REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO A DECLARATION BY KENNEDY THAT THE UNITED STATES OUGHT TO "STRENGTHEN THE NON-BATISTA DEMOCRATIC ANTI-CASTRO FORCES IN EXILE AND IN CUBA ITSELF WHO OFFER EVENTUAL HOPE OF OVERTHROWING CASTRO."

A168WX
WASHINGTON -SECOND ADD FIRST LEAD NIXON BOOK (A166WX)
X X X HE WAS

X X X CASTRO."

THE FORMER VICE PRESIDENT, WHO LOST TO KENNEDY BY A NARROW MARGIN, SAID KENNEDY HAD BEEN GIVEN A SECRET BRIEFING IN WHICH HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WAS TRAINING CUBAN EXILES FOR AN INVASION.

I THOUGHT ETC., 3RD GRAF A12WX

JC1259PES NM

A11WX (ADD NIXON)

(360)

WASHINGTON THIRD ADD FIRST LEAD NIXON BOOK (A168WX) X X X AN INVASION. NIXON WROTE THAT KENNEDY'S CALL FOR STRONGER ACTION AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO PUT NIXON INTO A CORNER AND FORCED HIM TO TAKE A PUBLIC STAND AT VARIANCE WITH VIEWS HE HAD BEEN STATING PRIVATELY, BECAUSE "THE OPERATION HAD TO BE PROTECTED AT ALL COSTS."

HE SAYS IT WAS THE ONLY TIME IN THE ARDUOUS CAMPAIGN THAT HE BECAME ENRAGED WITH HIS DEMOCRATIC OPPONENT.

ASKED FOR COMMENT AT HIS CONFERENCE WITH NEWSMEN TODAY, SALINGER READ A PREPARED STATEMENT IN WHICH HE DENIED THAT KENNEDY WAS TOLD BEFORE ELECTION DAY OF ANY PLANS FOR SUPPORTING A CUBAN INVASION.

KENNEDY, THE STATEMENT SAID, WAS FIRST ADVISED OF THE OPERATION BY DULLES AND RICHARD BISSELL, FORMER DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FOR PLANS, AT A PRIVATE BRIEFING IN PALM BEACH NOV. 18, 1960.

SALINGER REFUSED TO COMMENT ON OTHER PORTIONS OF NIXON'S BOOK, WHICH IS DUE OUT LATE THIS MONTH. LIFE MAGAZINE IS CURRENTLY PUBLISHING EXCERPTS.

KENNEDY HAS READ THE SECTION IN THE MAGAZINE IN WHICH NIXON CHARGED HIM WITH A SECURITY VIOLATION, SALINGER SAID.

SALINGER SAID NEITHER KENNEDY NOR ANYONE AT THE WHITE HOUSE HAS BEEN IN PERSONAL TOUCH WITH NIXON REGARDING THE CHARGES.

THE PRESS SECRETARY READ THIS STATEMENT:

"THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS ARE A PROPER SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACCOUNT IN MR

(MORE)

NY-134PES

A13WX

WASHINGTON--4TH ADD FIRST LEAD NIXON BOOK (A11) X X X STATEMENT: "THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS ARE A PROPER SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACCOUNT IN MR. NIXON'S BOOK IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THE THEN SEN. KENNEDY WAS NOT TOLD BEFORE THE ELECTION OF 1960 OF THE TRAINING OF TROOPS OUTSIDE OF CUBA OR OF ANY PLANS FOR 'SUPPORTING AN INVASION OF CUBA.' MR. NIXON'S ACCOUNT IS APPARENTLY BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING. SEN. KENNEDY RECEIVED TWO BRIEFINGS FROM MR. ALLEN DULLES OF THE CIA, THE FIRST ON JULY 23, 1960, AND THE SECOND ON SEPT. 19, 1960. THE TWO BRIEFINGS COVERED AN OVER-ALL REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION DURING WHICH CUBA WAS MENTIONED, BUT SEN. KENNEDY WAS FIRST INFORMED OF THE OPERATION TO WHICH MR. NIXON REFERS IN A BRIEFING BY ALLEN DULLES AND RICHARD BISSELL OF THE CIA GIVEN IN PALM BEACH, FLA., ON NOV. 18, 1960."

IN ADDITION TO THE TWO PRE-ELECTION BRIEFINGS BY DULLES, KENNEDY WAS ALSO FILLED IN ON CIA ACTIVITIES BY GEN. CHARLES CABELL IN A PRIVATE MEETING NOV. 2, BUT WHITE HOUSE SOURCES SAID CUBA WAS NOT MENTIONED ON THAT OCCASION.

KENNEDY SOUNDED HIS DEMAND FOR SUPPORT OF ANTI-CASTRO ELEMENTS OCT. 20, 1960.

SALINGER SAID THE ONLY REASON THE WHITE HOUSE REACTED TO THE NIXON ALLEGATION REGARDING THE CUBAN OPERATION WAS BECAUSE IT COMMANDED WIDE NATIONAL INTEREST.

"I THOUGHT ETC., 3RD GRAF AS BEFORE.

SR145PES

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND MR. DULLES, 3/21/62.

12:45 p.m.

Mr. Dulles: I had a call this morning from General Eisenhower; we had a good talk, he was very relaxed, wanted his memory refreshed a bit, was wondering whether he should say anything but on balance decided not to. I think he probably won't. I said I thought looking it-at at it from this angle the sooner it faded away the better it would be. I think the publicity yesterday has worked out pretty well. Ike urged me to put in a call for Dick Nixon. I wanted to talk to you first. Ike thought maybe I could do some good; I may not do any good, but what do you think?

Mr. McCone: I don't know. I don't think it would do any good. ^{It} ~~Dick~~ is always nice to talk with him but I don't think it will do any good. He's gone as far as he will go and this was not satisfactory to the President, but --

Mr. Dulles: The President won't say any more will he?

Mr. McCone: He may have to say something in his press conference this afternoon. I would wait and see what happens at the press conference.

Mr. Dulles: I may wait until after the press conference. I think maybe he (Ike) thought I would have some influence in his not going again on the defensive.

Mr. McCone: I think Nixon would like to forget about the whole thing. He has agreed to footnote his book along the lines I gave you yesterday.

Mr. Dulles: The footnote that I saw referred to an admission by Kennedy in his statement of yesterday that he knew about the training but not the invasion.

Mr. McCone: Well, the President said -- wait until I get it here. (Read the footnote from the New York Times.) I think there's a difference between you and Nixon in the fact that I think that Nixon is under the impression that Kennedy knew through you of covert activities although they were not in support of the invasion.

Mr. Dulles: Well he didn't.

Mr. McCone: This is the footnote the way I got it. (Then read the footnote.)

Mr. Dulles: Well Kennedy didn't say anything like that. He indicates that he was not briefed on the training program. This is quoting what Kennedy said. I don't say he's one hundred per cent sure on that but that's what he believes and that's what he said.

Mr. McCone: I've been trying to review just who said what.

Mr. Dulles: Well, I don't expect to talk to Nixon about footnotes or anything like that.

Mr. McCone: When I was first brought into this thing it was merely that Kennedy was disturbed because of the accusation that he knew about the invasion so this was at the time that Ed Thompson of Life and McCormack were trying to get together to take that clause out so the clause re support of the invasion was removed. Bundy, Salinger, everybody liked it. Then yesterday morning about 10:30 they took the thing into the President and he said he didn't like that change. He said he preferred to meet the thing head on, but what I wanted to ~~see~~ see was a removal of all briefing of any kind. If he wants it head on, might as well let it go the way it is and not worry about it. Then I had about a dozen phone calls of which I just have a note here and there on them which doesn't really pin down much of anything. The whole thrust of the White House problem was over the support of the invasion problem. No question in anybody's mind that Kennedy knew anything about the support of the invasion program.

Mr. Dulles: I think you're wrong on that. I argued with Mac on that. From the beginning they have wanted to delete the statement about the training and the invasion. And I would prefer that he not go that far. I explained this to Ike this morning. The reason for our going down there on the 18th was to brief him on the thing. He didn't know anything about --

Mr. McCone: Nixon said in March of 1960 there was a decision made about training for an invasion.

Mr. Dulles: In September the whole emphasis was on guerrilla. At the time of the debate there was no plan for an invasion. Nixon is just 100 per cent wrong on that.

Mr. McCone: I think he recognizes that the decision to actually make the move was naturally not made in March.

Mr. Dulles: They weren't being trained for that. The change came in November but as of the time I briefed him there was no thought of an invasion. Just training small cadres for guerrilla warfare.

Mr. McCone: Well here's what he said to me yesterday morning. (Talked here about Nixon saying a Quatamala type operation would be undertaken, according to a decision made, etc. - at some length).

Mr. Dulles: He's gotten this thing all mixed up. There was an idea at one time of sending them out to ~~Japan~~ Saipan or something like that, but when it leaked a little we turned it over in our minds and dismissed it. We developed this plan

after working with Defense, State, etc., and I sympathize with his wanting to be in the foreground but I can find no record of a memorandum he says he sent us on this subject. Can find it nowhere in the Agency.

Mr. McCone: He talked to me here about a meeting in March of 1960 in which the decision was made that Castro must go even if we have to resort to a Quatamala type of operation in which men were trained across the border and then moved in. Now I don't see any useful purpose in calling Nixon.

Mr. Dulles: Well Ike asked me to call him so I'm under a little compulsion to do it. But I think I'll wait until after the President's press conference this afternoon.

Mr. McCone: Here gave Mr. Dulles Mr. Nixon's phone numbers.

Mr. Dulles: I think I'll wait until after I hear the press conference. If the President takes the offensive then he'll have to come back. If nothing happens then I think both sides have had their say. There was a perfectly honest misunderstanding here. Ike asked me to call and I don't think I can say no. I told Ike the less said about this the better. Its all ancient history now.

Mr. McCone: Well, we'll see what happens.

Mr. Dulles: I'll let you know John. I'm a little caught on this. I would rather not call him because I think it might be a little unpleasant.

Mr. McCone: My advice would be to wait -- call Ike and tell him look this is a one day wonder and it would serve no useful purpose for me to call Dick. This statement was very satisfactory at the White House but it is very unsatisfactory today. He (Nixon) was perfectly willing to withdraw the reference about the invasion. But your instructions from Ike were to tell Kennedy what was going on.

Mr. Dulles: These briefings are not what people think they are.

Mr. McCone: I plan to call Mr. Salinger and tell him to suggest to the President that if the question comes up today to just brush it off and say he can't add anything to what was in the paper.

Mr. Dulles agreed this was a very good idea and the conversation closed.

R. T.

March 20, 1962

For Mr. McCone's perusal and approval:

The President does not believe that intelligence briefings are a proper subject of public debate. But in the light of the account in Mr. Nixon's book, it seems necessary to say that the then Senator Kennedy knew nothing of any plans for "supporting an invasion of Cuba" before the election of 1960. Mr. Nixon's account is apparently based on a misunderstanding of what was included in the briefings Senator Kennedy received in July and September 1960.

Senator Kennedy was informed of the operation in a briefing by Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, given in Palm Beach on November 18, 1960,. Mr. Nixon has been informed of this matter and it is our understanding that this statement will be corrected in subsequent editions of his book.

AT

Footnote:

It was my understanding and that of all others within the Administration familiar with the operation that the objective of this training program was for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself. President Kennedy has since stated (March 20, 1962) however, that when he was briefed on the CIA training program he was not specifically informed that its purpose was to support an invasion.

Telephone Calls, March 20, 1962, Continued:

4:50 p.m. Mr. Thompson called the DCI. Asked if Ken McCormack had called him. DCI replied that he had and that he understood that the line re the Cuban invasion had been taken out. Mr. Thompson said what he was going to do was to put an insert in and then quote the footnote that is in the second edition of the book. Mr. Thompson was somewhat confused during this call as to the exact status of the deletion and the footnote. Mr. McCone said he definitely felt it would be better to leave the line out; and Mr. Thompson said the reason he called was because he was under the impression that McCormack had called Mr. McCone and gotten permission to put the line back in. McCone stated "No when he called me, the line was out and the footnote was in." Mr. Thompson said McCormack had said he (Nixon ?) wanted it back in the book and was going to try to get it back in the article. DCI said he thought it would be too bad to put it back in. Mr. Thompson said he would try to get the matter cleared up, was sorry to have bothered him so much, and thanked Mr. McCone for his time, stating he hoped he would not have to bother him again.

R.P.

TELEPHONE CALLS, MARCH 20, 1962 (DCI)

10:15 a.m. DCI spoke with Charles Murphy re the Nixon book. DCI stated the White House wanted to get some kind of a statement that can be used by the President today. He then read the proposed statement to Mr. Murphy -- remainder of call not monitored due to all other phones ringing.

11:05 a.m. DCI spoke with Mr. Bundy and read from the Nixon book on page 354. Mr. Bundy stated they were now proposing to put out a statement from the White House re the erroneous clause concerning the Cuban invasion. Mr. McCone said he had a few changes he would propose in the statement which Mr. Bundy had given on the telephone previously, and read these proposed changes to Mr. Bundy. Mr. Bundy stated he would prefer to keep the statement in a negative vein (stating what the President had not been briefed on rather than outlinging what he had been briefed on). Mr. McCone agreed that this was probably wise. Mr. Bundy then asked the DCI if he could reach Nixon very shortly and give him (Bundy) the results of his conversation with him, and Mr. McCone said he would try.

Mr. Salinger then called and Mr. McCone stated the two sentences, or parts of sentences, would be deleted; they then discussed the statement which the President is considering making.

3:05 p.m. Mr. Nixon called DCI and stated that DCI had probably noticed that Mr. Salinger had put out a statement which says in effect that Kennedy knew nothing about the matter, and that he was not briefed until November about this business; stated that it put him in quite a spot because as he and Mr. McCone had talked previously, it was very clear that Kennedy had been briefed on the fact that there was a training program.

Mr. McCone read the statement to Mr. Nixon. Mr. Nixon responded that Mr. McCone had indicated that Kennedy had been briefed at least in general terms by Allen Dulles to the effect that we were supporting the underground and training guerrillas. He asked if there was any question of Kennedy's knowing that. Mr. McCone said "No, I don't think so."

Mr. Nixon stated he was going to handle the matter by a footnote, but not in terms of a correction. ("This is his version, and this is mine.") He then read the footnote and said that he had spoken to Mr. McCormack and that Mr. McCormack would be calling the DCI to give him the wording of it. Mr. Nixon said he had rewritten the footnote but what it does in effect is to state what Kennedy stated. ("He thought the training program was for one reason, I thought it was for another.") Mr. Nixon said that if Mr. Dulles didn't tell Mr. Kennedy about the invasion plans, Smathers did -- "Bob and I are fairly close." Mr. Nixon said that his point was that Kennedy did ~~not~~ know we were training guerrillas and the whole argument was whether he knew this was for the purpose of an invasion. Then stated that he "had cleaned it up and McCormack will phone it down to you."

TELEPHONE CALLS, MARCH 16, 1962 (DCI)

10:25 a.m. DCI spoke to General Taylor re the meeting of the Special Group this afternoon. General Taylor asked that the group be kept as small as possible -- limited as nearly as possible to the basic group.

TELEPHONE CALLS, MARCH 19, 1962 (DCI)

8:55 a.m. DCI spoke with Dr. Scoville stating he had several points he wished to take up with him; appt. set for 11:45. Also discussed points that the DCI should know prior to his meeting [REDACTED]

STAT

9:07 a.m. DCI talked with Charles Murphy re the Nixon Book. Stated that Newsweek says Kennedy had been briefed by Allen Dulles re the Cuban situation. Does not make reference to the Cuban invasion. The White House wants to know what is going to be done about publishing the book. Mr. Murphy stated that Mr. Dulles and he had talked to Thompson of Life and some changes were made. DCI said he would like to know whether the changes are going to be made.

9:35 a.m. DCI spoke with Mr. Salinger re the Nixon book. Stated he had been in touch with Mr. McCormack of Doubleday who on Friday had been talking with Nixon about revising the second edition of the book to delete the reference to "plans for the invasion of Cuba." Nixon made a decision that he didn't think it could be done because 60,000 copies were already in circulation. After his talk this morning McCormack felt it still necessary and incumbent upon him to try to get them to revise the second printing. He is going to call Nixon this morning and then report back. DCI suggested that if the White House gets a question before the final report is made, just to say the statement is erroneous and corrections are to be made.

10:20 a.m. Mr. Bundy called DCI re the Nixon book. Asked the DCI what the status was now on the incorrect statement. DCI stated Life Magazine is deleting the phrase about the invasion, and that this had been agreed to by Nixon. Doubleday was in touch with Nixon on Friday to modify the second printing of the book. Doubleday was going back to Nixon this morning for the purpose of trying to convince Nixon to permit the reediting of that particular clause in the second printing. In view of this don't think the President or anyone can take exception to the clause in Newsweek. Mr. Bundy said the last thing the President wanted was a row with Nixon; that it was not worth it; but that what he was concerned about was to get the statement corrected. He said the facts of the situation are that President Kennedy was briefed on support given to certain guerrilla training activities as it stood months before the election. He knew nothing of any larger plans including the invasion plans until after the election. The President did receive certain briefing on the guerrilla plans as they stood in July 1959. DCI said Nixon is terribly disturbed about this thing.

March 19, 1962

TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS:

9:30 a.m. Mr. Charles Murphy. "I talked with my friend Thompson. He had passed on the LIFE text to the publisher, Doubleday. He did not know what they were going to do. He got to speak to Nixon on Friday on the West Coast on the LIFE changes. There are now 60,000 copies. Nixon's disposition was to make no changes. I impressed on the McCormack people the potential importance of it and that Nixon would lose the argument. He is going to call Nixon again and you will hear further. I told McCormack what Allen had told the President and that I would have to decide against. Will call again late today."

JI

Conversation with Pierre Salinger - 20 March - and the President

S: What is our last understanding?

DCI: I haven't got word yet. Doubleday was unable to contact him yesterday; he refused on Friday to do it because 60,000 copies were out, he thought it was futile.

President: We will read you the statement that Pierre will put out.
(read statement) (Needs date that Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed him in Palm Beach)

DCI: I would say this: I would say that the statement is in error and undoubtedly will be corrected.

President: xxx because he would love to get me in an argument.
(discussion by President and Mr. Salinger)

Salinger: I will give this to you and then you can talk to Nixon and if Nixon won't make any correction.

DCI: They called in yesterday; they said that Nixon was out of circulation this morning .

Now, if we could say "It is my understanding that Mr. Nixon has been informed of this and " ...

Salinger: Our time problem is that I meet the press at noon - the President's ~~xxxxx~~ at 4:00 this afternoon.

STAT

DCI: One other question - have you got a statement on the [] for the President's Press Conference ? K

STAT

Salinger: The President's is tomorrow. I don't have anything yet on the []

STAT

DCI: Be prepared for it.

JI

Conversation with Messrs. Salinger and Bundy - 20 March 1962

DCI: Regarding page 354 - there will be a deletion of "covert"
 (discussion of page)
 that is what LIFE last night said. They are calling me from
 New York. I'll get through to Nixon and see what we....

DCI: I've got some changes .

Salinger: I've got a copy up on my desk ...

Bundy: What's your worry about it.

DCI: There are a few changes that might strengthen it a little bit.

Salinger: Both wire services are out with the story. I don't think that it should
 be allowed to get much more momentum.
 I understand that there is a revision.

DCI: Yes, I read it to Mr. Dulles

JJ

Conversation with Mr. Thompson - 20 March 1962

T: Mr. Dulles told me a couple of times and very positively, he wasn't too clear on the Cuban briefings; he did give Sen. Kennedy a briefing but he did not tell him there was going to be an invasion.

In one period of 16 hours, I've talked to Dulles and Nixon several times; the results of all this

"I asked Seaton to call the White House at once on the security line and find out whether or not Dulles had briefed Kennedy on the fact that for months the CIA had not only been supporting and assisting but actually training Cuban exiles" leaving out "for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself.

Mr. Nixon very reliably agreed for us to do that.

He is out campaigning. This statement will be corrected in the current report of the book; in Life Magazine. We are not using that part of it. It is true that we corrected the manuscript but at the moment we have nothing to correct.

It is so far not true that it is being held. Mr. Nixon will be using a statement later in the day -

(Telephone numbers for Mr. Nixon: Office:
Home:
Rosemary Woods - Secretary

ST
ST

T: He thinks he has it on very high authority.

DCI: He doesn't, because it wasn't planned.

T: He claims it was planned. It finally came down to this. I am not a lawyer, but only Mr. Dulles and Senator Kennedy were present and I said to him what you have is second-hand evidence. but he would have been quite happy to let it stand.

DCI: I'll be here all day.

T: My telephone number is

ST

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Telephone Conversation with Mr. Richard M. Nixon - 20 March 1962 - 11:30 a. m.

DCI: we have no record of having gone that far.

Nixon: Let me say this - if that is what Allen has informed you, I was the one who insisted on making this decision - March 1960, in which a decision was made to cross the border from Nicaragua to Guatemala. At that time a decision was made to acquire an island; and that was changed for the purpose of doing it. Here is the point: I will certainly take Dulles' word that he did not inform anybody of an invasion. Mr. Dulles so informed me and Ed Thompson of LIFE that he had in his briefing with Kennedy, in general terms, informed him that we were giving some assistance to the training of Cuban exiles without mentioning the invasion. I am willing to take that correction if that is the meat of the coconut. x.... the purpose of those was to infiltrate them into the hills. That is not an invasion. The point as far as I was concerned .. the purpose of this invasion was to overthrow Castro; to do what was necessary, guatemala type. Kennedy came out for aiding Cuba in his campaign; giving aid to cause of freedom inside and outside Cuba.

DCI: Mr. McCone read from the book
(agreement reached to end sentence with "assisting by Cuban exiles")
Mr. McCone asked on future printings if that particular change could be made.

Nixon: Let me put it this way. I don't like the White House inference ...
I'll put in a footnote indicating that Kennedy has denied that he was informed that the purpose of this training program was for the purpose of invading Cuba.

DCI: Kennedy is not questioning that point; the fact that the words are "for the invasion of Cuba" for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself.
There was one thing I questioned. This disturbs me very much. . when you talk about U. S. covert intelligence estimates.
I agree that the Cuban situation is in the public domain, but when you talk about covert operations around the world; it isn't common knowledge that we have intelligence estimates. STAT

Nixon: STAT

DCI: I was there when the President told AWD at the end of the NSC Meeting to keep Kennedy informed. His objection is to the invasion; not to the fact that there was a training program.

DCI: Let me read you the kind of a statement the President will make:
(statement read) At the briefings that Sen. Kennedy receives, he was
told of the fact that we were helping train and assist Cuban exiles.
We were supporting the underground and training Cuban exiles.

Nixon: I can say that. Otherwise what were they being trained for - doing the
twist at the White House?

DCI: One other paragraph. Sen. Kennedy was first informed in a briefing
on November 18 in thinking that you might change the book - "Mr. Nixon
has been informed of this"

No - this statement will be corrected. President Kennedy's statement
will be included -

I will include the detailed statement - President Kennedy's understanding
will be referred to. I think that is the proper way.

I still have some grave concessions on it - it is hard to - I am not trying
to Kennedy came out for it hard in the campaign; he had been
briefed

DCI: How are you otherwise, etc.

Pierre Salinger - I just talked to the President. He doesn't think the changes
are particularly helpful, that it will assist the Nixon campaign. He
keeps making the same charge anyway and takes out the debatable points.
If it had been left the other way, at least it is a head-on decision.
He questions the July 23 date.

DCI: He won't say that the statement will be corrected, but that President
Kennedy's understanding will be. I frankly feel that AWD had it so
completely in his mind that they were training for this invasion that
Allen couldn't have talked to him

Telephone Conversation on 20 March - Kenneth McCormack

Conversation with Mr. Ken McCormack: I just spoke to Mr. Nixon and he was grateful to you for that editing. He has changed it slightly. He will start it with "While it was my clear understanding - strike and that of all others within the Administration familiar with the operation - and the rest of the sentence is all right through "Cuba" - strike "itself" continue President Kennedy stated on March 20; take out "however" continue as it goes. This will be in all future editions.

DCI: How is the book going?

Mc: I am happy to say it is running away. 60,000 copies are exhausted; may sell a quarter of a million. Advance reviews are very good. He thanks you for your shrewd editorial change;

DCI: It may save him some problems in some quarter.

JI

Footnote:

It was my understanding and that of all others within the
Administration familiar with the operation that the objective of
this training program was for the eventual purpose of supporting
an invasion of Cuba ~~itself~~. President Kennedy ~~has since~~ stated
(March 20, 1962) ~~however~~, that when he was briefed on the CIA
training program he was not specifically informed that its purpose
was to support an invasion.